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INTRODUCTION
I would like to begin by offering my congratulations to the South African Law 
Journal on its 120 years of publication and on its status as the oldest continuously 
published English-language law journal in the world.  At least for me, it has always been 
the readiest portal through which to enter the world of South African law, and I have 
long relished its unique blend of scholarship, passion and wit.  It is a real privilege to be a 
member of the journal’s Editorial Board and to be given this opportunity to contribute 
towards this celebration, not only of the journal’s 120 years, but also of a decade of the 
Bill of Rights in South African law.
The impact of the Bill of Rights upon the law of delict and contract is not one 
upon which I can claim any special expertise.  My approach is that of a Scottish private 
lawyer who in 1997-98 found himself obliged for the first time to consider the subject of 
human rights by dint of the Parliamentary passage of the Human Rights Act and the 
Scotland Act in the UK.  A conference on the subject was held in Edinburgh in June 
1998, the whole basis of which was to elicit the initial response of Scots lawyers without 
a background in human rights law as to its likely impact in their fields (mine being the 
law of obligations and intellectual property).1   What this led to for me was the discovery 
that the Human Rights Act provided, at least potentially, for indirect horizontal 
application of the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth ECHR) in 
private law and private disputes,2  by way of what I later learned was what Aharon Barak, 
President of the Israeli Supreme Court, had dubbed an ‘application to the judiciary’ 
                                               
*  LLB Hons (Edin), PhD (Edin), FRSE.  This is the revised and much expanded text of a lecture given at 
the South African Law Journal 1884-2004 Jubilee Conference on 3 October 2003.  I am grateful to 
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model of horizontality.3  The Human Rights Act does not say that private parties may 
enforce Convention rights against each other; rather, the Act makes it unlawful for public 
authorities to act in a way incompatible with a Convention right, and includes amongst 
these public authorities courts and tribunals.4  Thus in deciding disputes between private 
parties courts and tribunals had to act compatibly with Convention rights, which would 
include, not only their procedures and remedies, but also their handling of the 
substantive law being applied in the case.  Another section of the Act required courts to 
read and give effect to legislation in a way compatible with Convention rights.5  In 
addition the courts were given power to declare legislation of the United Kingdom  
Parliament incompatible with Convention rights (but leaving such legislation still in force 
albeit subject to amendment by Parliament),6 while under the Scotland Act legislation of 
the new Scottish Parliament could be wholly avoided if it was incompatible with 
Convention rights.7
The full significance of these provisions, and in particular indirect horizontality, 
was difficult to read in relation to my chosen fields.  It was most obvious in relation to 
the law of delict, in particular the liability of public authorities for harm resulting from 
their action (or more often, inaction), and also the law of nuisance and defamation;8 least 
obvious in the law of intellectual property, although rights of freedom of expression 
might well have some effect in relation to copyright and the protection of confidential 
information;9 and somewhere in between was the law of contract, in which issues about 
inequality of bargaining power and public policy, especially with regard to employment 
and consumers, might be able to find a further voice through the application of human 
rights.10  Above all perhaps was the protection of privacy, a right recognised by Article 8 
ECHR but not as such in the common law of England, and all but invisible also in 
Scottish jurisprudence.11
Along the way of the tentative exploration outlined above, I dipped a 
comparative toe in the South African jurisprudence, noting above all the finding of the 
indirect horizontality of the Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution in Du Plessis v De 
                                               
3 See A Barak, “Constitutional human rights and private law”, in D Friedmann and D Barak-Erez (eds), 
Human Rights in Private Law (2001), 13-42.
4 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 6.
5 Ibid, s. 3.
6 Ibid, s. 4.
7 Scotland Act 1998, s. 29(1)(d).
8 See discussion in MacQueen and Brodie (n. 2), at 141 (n. 3), 156-61. 
9 Ibid, 146-7, discussing the case of Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch 149 (CA).
10 Ibid, 162-4.
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Klerk12 and academic discussion of what the difference between direct and indirect 
horizontality might entail;13  and also some instances where there had been some effect 
from human rights on the content of the law, particularly in contract, with regard to 
interpretation and the availability of remedies.14  But my investigation was very limited 
and ad hoc.  Nor would I claim today to have gone much more deeply into the developing 
South African law.  But I have at least read a little more widely, and been struck by a 
number of points which I will share with you today.  My perspective will be comparative, 
considering the British (that is, the English and the Scottish) and the South African 
experiences to date.  I will not necessarily be looking to solve any of the problems which 
exist in the various systems, because, as will emerge, I am not certain that any immediate 
conclusions can or even should be drawn; but my comments may help to stimulate 
further discussion and thought in and about them.
SOME CONTRASTS
Context: transformation  
My first observation is the great difference in context.  On 17 February 2003 Mr 
Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court gave a lecture in Edinburgh, from which I 
first fully appreciated what it means to say that the South African Constitution is a 
constitution for transformation of the country, and the Constitutional Court sees the 
document and its own jurisdiction as a strong means to this end.  This perception 
powerfully informs the reasoning of the Court in many of the cases I have read, notably 
the ones on the delictual liability of public authorities and on defamation.  Moreover the 
transformation being sought is not just one in the governance of South Africa, but in the 
very fabric of society as a whole – in the behaviour and perceptions of all people in 
South Africa, as both public and private actors.  Hence the importance of the extension 
of the Bill of Rights into private as well as public law.  There is a clear (and probably 
conscious) parallel with the approach of the German Constitutional Court (the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht), in its establishment in the Lüth case in 195815 of the indirect 
horizontal effect of the Basic Law in private law, against a background where the inter-
                                                                                                                                      
11 Ibid, 168-71.  See further, on subsequent developments, H L MacQueen, “Human rights and private law 
in Scotland: a response to President Barak”, [2003] 78 Tulane Law Review forthcoming; and below, 000-000.
12 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC).
13 In particular A Cockrell, “The Bill of Rights and private law: a threshold issue of ‘horizontality’”, 
Butterworths Bill of Rights Compendium (1997), and A Fagan, “Determining the stakes: binding and non-
binding bills of rights”, in Friedmann and Barak-Erez (n. 3).
14 Dabelstein v Hildebrand 1996 (3) SA 42 (C); Farr v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2000 (3) SA 684 (C); 
Janse van Reensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 (1) SA 315 (C).
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war Weimar constitution had wholly failed to prevent the catastrophe of Hitler and the 
Nazi government for the German people between 1933 and 1945: 
This system of values, centring on the freedom of the human being to develop in 
society … must direct and inform legislation, administration, and judicial 
decision.  It naturally influences private law as well; no rule of private law may 
conflict with it, and all such rules must be construed in accordance with its 
spirit.16
A more contemporary parallel is to be found in the constitutions of the formerly 
Communist states of Eastern Europe, many of which appear to be opting for the direct 
application of human rights in private disputes as well as those involving public bodies.17
In contrast, the United Kingdom  domestication of the ECHR was not informed 
by a desire for a revolutionary transformation of society or even by a new vision of the 
State in Britain.  After all the United Kingdom  was one of the principal movers behind 
the creation of the ECHR in the late 1940s, and was a member state of the Convention 
from its very beginning, albeit one that only allowed its citizens access to the European 
Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights) in 1966.18  Despite the 
absence of a written constitution, a stable Parliamentary democracy and welfare state are 
already in existence in an increasingly multi-cultural country.  This did not arise by way of 
a revolution or an overthrow of the old order of things other than the replacement of the 
Stuart with the Hanoverian monarchy in 1688-89, which explains the survival until 
recently of such relics of the past as the hereditary members of the upper chamber of the 
legislature, the House of Lords.  Extreme politics of either right or left have never gained 
enough electoral support to come anywhere near government.  Parliamentary supremacy 
is not generally abused (although concerns exist at present about the increasing security 
and emergency powers being legislated for by government since the events of 11 
September 2001), and political disagreements are encapsulated within a system where 
government changes political stripe with some regularity.  The keynote of public 
discourse is tolerance rather than violence (with the notable exception, until lately, of 
                                                                                                                                      
15 7 BverfGE 198.
16 For this translation, see B S Markesinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations (3rd 
edn., 1997), vol. 2, 355.  On the historical background, see A Heldrich and G M Rehm, “Importing 
constitutional values through blanket clauses”, in Friedmann and Barak-Erez (n. 3), 113-15. On the aim of 
the Basic Law to change the post-Nazi attitudes and values of the German people, see R Eatwell, Fascism: 
A History (1996), 218.
17 This is documented in a book review by Olha Cherednychenko, “Human rights and private law”, (2003) 
10 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 301.
18 For a detailed account of UK involvement in the ECHR down to 1966, see A W Brian Simpson, Human 
Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (2001).
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Northern Ireland), the death penalty has been long abolished,19 and legislation against 
gender, racial and, more recently, disability discrimination is firmly established,20 even if  
“one cannot create a community of saints by statute”.21  Legislation also exists for the 
promotion of health and safety at work, data protection, and now freedom of 
information,22 and these areas of public policy, like sex, race and disability discrimination, 
are largely controlled through the activities of specialist public agencies and 
commissioners,23 rather than via courts and litigation.  Judicial review of administrative 
action is well developed, but is largely respectful of the separate territories of the judiciary 
and the executive.  There are major problems of social exclusion, organised crime, anti-
social behaviour and consequential public fear of crime, but these are not the kind of 
problem that respond to merely constitutional change.
The main reason for domestication of human rights in 1998 was pragmatic – to 
stop having cases on the ECHR which originated in Britain decided only in the 
European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, and to give citizens the opportunity to 
raise these matters first in our courts rather than abroad.  This, as well as the history of 
British involvement in the creation of the ECHR, lies behind the title of the White Paper 
published in 1997 in which the new Labour Government announced its intention to 
legislate for the domestication of the ECHR – Bringing Rights Home.24  It was also hoped 
that decisions of the British courts on the ECHR might be taken into account by, and 
influence, the decision-making of the Strasbourg court, which was sometimes thought 
not to be as well informed as it might be on the distinctive laws and legal systems within 
the United Kingdom .  A further context was provided by another of the new 
government’s constitutional reforms, devolution of legislative power to Scotland, and the 
decision to limit the powers of the Scottish Parliament and Executive by reference to 
Convention rights.25  
                                               
19 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965.
20 See the Equal Pay Act 1970; Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Race Relations Act 1976 and Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000; Disability Discrimination Act 1996.
21 T B Smith, Basic Rights and their Enforcement (1979), 47.
22 See Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974; Data Protection Acts 1984 and 1998; Freedom of 
Information Act 2001; Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.
23 Although the UK Government is considering the creation of a single body, the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, to administer discrimination laws, and to replace the Commissions for Racial Equality, 
Equal Opportunity and Disability Discrimination (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3223045.stm), 
while the Scottish Executive will be creating a Human Rights Commission in the near future (see its 
Consultation Paper of February 2003, The Scottish Human Rights Commission
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/justice/shrs-00.asp).
24 Bringing Rights Home: the Human Rights Bill (Cm 3782: October 1997).
25 See the Scotland Act 1998.
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But the absence of any need or widespread desire for fundamental political or 
social transformation in the United Kingdom  means that we have had no parallel to 
some of the fundamental questions which have been addressed – or which have begun to 
be addressed – through Bill of Rights litigation in South Africa.  Thus in Scotland, for 
example, the great human rights issues have been about delay in criminal prosecutions,26
the appointment of judges,27 banning fox-hunting,28 and the impartiality of planning 
inquiries;29 not the kinds of issue which go to the roots of society and its values.  In 
contrast, the South African cases I have looked at have been about such fundamentals of 
a free and democratic society as social welfare, the freedom of the press, and the 
protection of society, and women in particular, from violence clearly perceived to be 
endemic; and all this only in the cases which can be said to involve private or common 
law dimensions alongside human rights.
Legislative framework
A second point on which difference is apparent is the framework on which it all 
rests.  The Human Rights Act continues to recognise the ultimate supremacy of 
Parliament in the United Kingdom, because the courts cannot declare a Westminster Act 
invalid, whereas Article 1 of the South African Constitution founds the Republic on 
human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights, non-
racialism and non-sexism, and the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.  
Neither the ECHR nor the Human Rights Act contain statements like the following 
from the South African Constitution and Bill of Rights:
s 8(1) – The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, executive, 
judiciary and all organs of the State
s 8(2) – A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if and 
to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right.
                                               
26 Dyer v Watson 2002 SC (PC) 89; HM Advocate v R 2003 SC (PC) 21. See also on the latter Attorney General’s 
Reference No 2 of 2001 [2003] UKHL 68.
27 Starrs v Ruxton 2000 JC 208; Millar v Dickson 2002 SC (PC) 30.
28 Adams v Scottish Ministers 2003 SLT 366 (subject to appeal); Whaley v Lord Advocate 2003 GWD 22-651.
29 County Properties Ltd v Scottish Ministers 2002 SC 79; Lafarge Redland Aggregates Ltd, Petitioners 2001 SC 298 
(subject to appeal).
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s 8(3) - When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person … a court – (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or 
if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right
s 39(1) – When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based upon equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
s 39(2) … when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.
United Kingdom  courts are obliged to interpret legislation to be consistent with, 
and give effect to, Convention rights,30 but apart from the general judicial obligation to 
comply with the ECHR,31 nothing similar is said about the common law.  This leaves it 
open for debate as to exactly how the indirect horizontality should work, and as to 
whether it should be ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, with Convention rights requiring, or merely 
influencing to varying degrees, the development of the common law.32  That debate has 
so far been conducted almost entirely in the academic literature, and not at all in decided 
cases (although there have been cases where such debate might have occurred, as I will 
discuss later).  There is also debate in South Africa as to exactly what sections 8(3) and 
39(2) mean, but it seems pretty clear that the overall effect of the sections quoted is 
intended to be generally direct and strong, with the common law to develop to give 
effect to rights.33  
                                               
30 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 3.
31 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 6; see above, text accompanying nn. 4, 5. 
32 For references see MacQueen and Brodie (n. 2), 153-154, and MacQueen (n. 11); add now D Beyleveld 
and S D Pattinson, “Human rights and horizontality”, (2002) 118 LQR 623. 
33 See, in addition to references at n. 13, e.g. L Wolhuter, “Horizontality in the interim and final 
constitutions”, (1996) 11 SAPL 512; S Woolman and D Davis, “The last laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, 
classical liberalism, creole liberalism and the application of fundamental rights under the interim and final 
Constitutions”, (1996) 12 SAJHR 361; H Cheadle and D Davis, “The application of the 1996 Constitution 
in the private sphere”, 1997 SAJHR 44; C Sprigman and M Osborne, “Du Plessis is not dead: South Africa’s 
1996 Constitution and the application of bill of rights to private disputes”, (1999) 15 SAJHR 42; I M 
Rautenbach, “The Bill of Rights applies to private law and binds private persons”, 2000 (2) TSAR 296; J de 
Waal, I Currie and G Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th edn, 2001), 45-6, 55-7.
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Crucially, as is emphasised in the negligence case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security,34 the courts have an obligation to develop the common law even when the 
parties to a case themselves do not refer to the Bill of Rights.  The Constitutional Court 
has held in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security35 that common law delictual remedies may 
provide all the relief that is needed in respect of a breach of constitutional rights.36  In the 
defamation case of Khumalo v Holomisa,37 O’Regan J held section 8(3) to mean that the 
Constitution is not necessarily of direct application to the common law, arguing that 
section 8(2) qualifies its application of the Constitution to private persons (“if and to the 
extent that [the right] is applicable”), unlike section 8(1) with regard to the organs of the 
State; and that section 8(3) would be meaningless if the Constitution applied directly to 
all common law.  This view misses the important point that section 8(1) “applies to all 
law” even before it applies to the organs of the State, which may necessitate a distinction 
between the constitutionality of legal rules, on the one hand, and that of actions by 
persons, public and private, acting in terms of otherwise valid rules; in other words, the 
Constitution does apply directly to all common law.  The requirement to develop the 
common law in section 8(3) arises when it is decided that a right is applicable in a 
particular private relation and situation and that existing law does not afford sufficient 
protection of that right in that situation.38  However in any event, in Khumalo O’Regan J 
also held that the nature of the subject matter (defamation) meant that freedom of 
expression was of direct horizontal application as contemplated by section 8(2).  If the 
common law was then found unconstitutional, the common law would have to be 
developed under section 8(3).    
There are also other significant differences between the text of the ECHR and 
the Bill of Rights.  These could be summarised as lying in the socio-economic area, with 
which the Bill of Rights is much more concerned than the ECHR.  So the latter contains 
nothing directly concerned with freedom of movement, residence, trade, occupation and 
profession, or on labour relations, the environment, housing, health care, food, water and 
social security.39  Perhaps more significantly from the point of view of private law, the 
                                               
34 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
35 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).
36 This has led Johan van der Walt to argue that the 1996 Constitution provides only for indirect horizontal 
application:  “Progressive indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: towards a co-operative 
relation between common-law and constitutional jurisprudence”, (2001) 17 SAJHR 341 at 350-5.
37 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC).
38 I M Rautenbach, “Engaging the text of section 8 of the Constitution in applying the Bill of Rights to law 
relating to private relations”, 2002 (4) TSAR 741.
39 Cf clauses 21-24, 26-27 of the Constitution.
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ECHR contains no positive affirmations of rights to equality or dignity,40 although it 
does prohibit “discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status” (ECHR Article 14).  Overall, however, the ECHR 
provides less open country for the transformation of private law than its South African 
counterpart, although that may change should the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union gain full legal status as part of the mooted Constitution of the 
European Union:41 as well as placing human dignity at the head of the list of rights 
(Article II-1), it covers such matters as freedom to choose an occupation and the right to 
engage in work (Article II-15), freedom to conduct a business (Article II-16), equality 
between men and women (Article II-23), rights of collective bargaining and action 
(Article II-28), and a high level of consumer protection (Article II-38).42
Finally, it should be noted that the limitations clause of the South African 
Constitution (section 36) is not exactly matched by anything in the ECHR, although a 
number of the Articles do limit rights by reference to such concepts as the needs of a 
democratic society (e.g. Articles 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, and First Protocol Article 1).  The 
exercise of a right aimed at destroying other persons’ rights under the Convention, or at 
limiting them to a greater extent than is provided for by the Convention, is prohibited 
under Article 17 ECHR. 
Court structure
Another contrasting aspect of the two frameworks is the court structure.  In 
South Africa, the division between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) appears to have given rise to concerns:  the latter has been seen, rightly or 
wrongly, as reluctant to take full account of the Bill of Rights in private law litigation, 
while a difficulty for the constitutional development of private law is the Constitutional 
Court’s relative lack of expertise in private law, and the SCA’s corresponding lack of 
expertise in constitutional law.43  A division of the courts into constitutional and other 
                                               
40 Cf clauses 9 and 10 of the Constitution.
41 For the draft Constitution, which was rejected at the Brussels European Council in December 2003, see 
the UK Government White Paper, A Draft Constitution for the European Union (Cm 5872, July 2003).  It is 
unclear at the time of writing whether and when the issue of a Constitution will return to the European 
Union agenda.
42 For the text of the Charter, see Official Journal of the European Communities, 18.12.2000, C364/1-22, 
available at http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/CharteEN.pdf. It forms Part Two of the draft European Constitution, 
and references to article numbers are to the latter document.
43 See van der Walt (above, n. 36).
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ones has never been a feature of either the English or the Scottish legal systems,44 and 
although the United Kingdom  looks set to replace the House of Lords with a Supreme 
Court in the near future, the Government clearly does not envisage that this will be a 
constitutional court, save that as part of its overall jurisdiction it will deal with 
constitutional matters.45  Ironically, the new arrangements are being proposed almost 
entirely to ensure that the structure of the highest appellate court does not fall foul of the 
ECHR.46  But tension of the kind that may have existed between the SCA and the 
Constitutional Court is unlikely to arise in the UK, and as a result we are unlikely to see 
discussions such as whether a distinction exists between the constitutional and private 
law concepts of privacy.47  Where tension does arise, however, is with regard to the 
continuing jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the decisions of which 
on issues related to private law have not always been well received in the United 
Kingdom courts.48
Impact on private law
Having said all this, it is striking how similar the areas of impact in private law 
have been in the two systems, at least in the context of delict and contract.  In delict 
there has been much litigation about the liability of public authorities, and about 
defamation.  There has been very little indeed about contract.  Nor is this surprising: Van 
Aswegen’s shrewd comments, made in 1995 in relation to the Interim Constitution of 
1993, still probably offer us the clearest explanation of the position so far in both South 
Africa and the UK:
Obviously, legal rules formulated with reference to policy considerations furnish 
the most effective method of incorporating the values underlying the protection 
of fundamental rights in a bill of rights into the fabric of private law.  It can be 
accepted that the bill of rights reflects the fundamental legal values accepted in a 
                                               
44 For the jurisdiction of the Privy Council in devolution issues, see Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 6.
45 Department of Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper, A Constitutional Reform: a Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom , CP 11/03, July 2003.
46 For the difficulties see Lord Bingham’s Constitution Unit Lecture of May 2002, “A new Supreme Court 
for the United Kingdom ”, accessible at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/files/90.pdf; and Lord Steyn, 
“The case for a Supreme Court”, (2002) 118 LQR 382.  Not all the Law Lords are convinced: see Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon, “The Law Lords: an endangered heritage”, (2003) 119 LQR 49; and the divided 
response of the Law Lords to the Consultation Paper, dated 27 October 2003 and accessible at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/JudicialSCR271003.pdf .  
47 D McQuoid-Mason, “Invasion of privacy: Common law v constitutional delict – does it make a 
difference?”, [2000] Acta Juridica 227.
48 See in particular Lord Hoffmann, “Human rights and the House of Lords”, (1999) 62 MLR 159, 
advocating British withdrawal from the Strasbourg court.  See further below, text accompanying nn. 63, 64.
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society, and as such it represents a crystallised form of public policy.  The policy 
considerations determining the contents and application of open-ended rules can 
therefore to a significant extent be extracted from the provisions of the bill of 
rights.  The South African law of delict is based on general principles of liability, 
and of the five general requirements for liability, two consist of open-ended 
standards and a third encompasses elements of policy.  The tests for 
wrongfulness and legal causation or remoteness are text-book examples of open-
ended standards: objective reasonableness in the light of the boni mores or legal 
convictions of the community in the first instance and the flexible criterion of a 
sufficiently close connection in the light of reasonableness, fairness and justice 
between conduct and harm in the second.  The test for negligence, based on the 
conduct of the reasonable man in the circumstances, also incorporates policy in 
the determination of reasonable conduct.  Indirect horizontal application should 
in principle be accomplished quite easily by utilising the values underlying 
fundamental rights as important policy considerations in the determination of
wrongfulness, remoteness and negligence in delict cases.  … The law of contract, 
unlike the law of delict, does not consist mainly, or even to any significant degree, 
of general principles of liability in the form of open-ended standards.  In fact the 
general principles of contractual liability consist for the most part of very precise, 
detailed rules with a fixed area of application. … Moreover, different types of 
contracts are regulated by a legion of specific additional rules.49
DELICT 
Van Aswegen’s forecast above appears to be well-borne out by the case of 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,50 which was concerned with the delictual liability 
of the police for having failed to prevent the sexually motivated assault and attempted 
murder of the plaintiff by one Coetzee, and subsequent decisions in the SCA.  The 
context of Carmichele was a small community in which Coetzee had already been arrested 
twice in respect of assaults on women but released pending trial; he had also been 
reported twice to the police as prowling around the house in which the plaintiff lived, 
and his mother had requested the authorities to take her son into custody.  Initially 
Chetty J in the Cape Provincial Division and the SCA refused to hold the police liable, 
                                               
49 A van Aswegen, “The implications of a Bill of Rights for the law of contract and delict”, (1995) 11 
SAJHR 50, at 60, 65.
50 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
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following previous authority on omissions,51 but on further appeal to the Constitutional 
Court it was held that the SCA had failed to mount an inquiry into the implications of 
the Bill of Rights in the case.  The inquiry was a two-stage one: whether the common law 
needed development to meet the requirements of the Constitution, and if so, how that 
development should take place.  In doing so, the court should bear in mind that the 
primary agent of law reform was the legislature rather than the judiciary; courts should 
only engage in the incremental kind of reform possible within particular cases.  In this 
case, the court should have considered the rights to life, dignity, freedom and security, 
privacy and freedom of movement, in assessing whether or not the conduct of the police 
had been wrongful.  The case having returned to Chetty J, he held the Minister to be 
liable,52 in the light of additional guidance from the SCA in two further police liability 
cases, Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 53 and Van Eeden v Minister of Safety 
and Security.54   In Van Duivenboden, the SCA said:
[T]he ‘convictions of the community’ must necessarily now be informed by the 
norms and values of our society as they have been embodied in the 1996 
Constitution.  The Constitution is the supreme law, and no norms and values that 
are inconsistent with it can have legal validity – which has the effect of making 
the Constitution a system of objective, normative values for legal purposes.55
In Van Eeden this passage was more or less repeated, but the Court added:
The Constitution cannot, however, be regarded as the exclusive embodiment of 
the delictual criterion of the legal convictions of the community, nor does it 
mean that this criterion will lose its status as an agent in shaping and improving 
the law of delict to deal with new challenges.56
It seems clear that the SCA has, in this area at least, fully accepted the role of the Bill of 
Rights in the development of the law of delict at least so far as concerns the liability of 
public authorities, although without giving up on the purely common law dimensions of 
the tests of wrongfulness.57  This seems to be correct, given that the common law test 
was already a dynamic one, encompassing the possibility of development,58 and that the 
court is expected first to consider the common law before moving to the question of 
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constitutional compatibility.  But what must also be correct is that the Constitution will 
outweigh any other factor in the test of wrongfulness in the perhaps unlikely event of any 
conflict or doubt.
However, this does not mean that the police are automatically liable to every 
victim of criminal violence, as the case of Saaiman v Minister of State and Safety 59  makes 
clear.  There, there was no liability for harm suffered by persons who were merely 
passers-by at an armed cash-in-transit robbery and who were, so to speak, incidentally 
shot when the firearms were discharged.  In Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety 
and Security, 60 PA were robbed of money, which the police traced.  When the police went 
to recover the money, they discovered that it had been stolen again, this time by three 
other (dishonest) policemen.  The issue in the case was whether the common law of 
vicarious liability should be developed to allow recovery from the Minister on the 
grounds of failure to protect property.  Kriegler J for the Constitutional Court held not.  
The constitutional protection of property was to protect rights against government 
action, not against dishonest policemen.  This was not a case about wrongfulness, unlike 
Carmichele, but was rather about the scope of liability for admittedly wrongful acts.  There 
was no reason to develop the common law to impose absolute liability on the State for 
dishonest employees.  The liability here was simply a common law matter for the 
ordinary courts to decide; the Constitutional Court would not say whether or not 
common law tests had been applied correctly. The second judgment of Chetty J in 
Carmichele itself is now under review in the SCA, and while the general approach to the 
case is clear from the Court’s other decisions on police liability, there are still common 
law questions to be answered about such matters as negligence and causation.
In all these police cases reference is made to the comparable jurisprudence arising 
from the approach to the question found in the UK.  In the leading case of Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire,61 which was a claim by the mother of the last of the many 
female victims of the notorious serial woman killer Peter Sutcliffe (also known as the 
Yorkshire Ripper), it was held that the police were not liable for the consequences of 
their failure to identify and catch Sutcliffe before the final killing, albeit that their 
investigation had not been a model of detection or police procedure.   The House of 
Lords thought that, in addition to the lack of proximity between the parties, it would not 
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be fair, just and reasonable to impose duties of this kind on the police, who should not 
be hampered by fears of civil liability in their investigation of crime.  One result of this 
decision was a finding of no liability by the English Court of Appeal in the subsequent 
case of Osman v Ferguson,62 where the killer in question was a person who, like the 
assailant in Carmichele, had been known to the police for some time as a serious threat to 
the ultimate victim.  That case went to the European Court of Human Rights, which 
ruled that the rights of the victim’s family had been infringed.  On the facts, this was not 
under Article 2 ECHR (right to life) (although that Article could give rise to a positive 
obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is 
at risk from the criminal acts of another individual); rather the liability was under Article 
6 (right of access to a court, or to a fair trial), because the rule in Hill was an immunity 
for the police which disabled the courts from investigating claims against them.63  
This ruling on Article 6 was highly controversial:  partly on the basis that it 
misunderstood English procedural rules on “striking out” cases; partly because the 
characterisation of the rule in Hill as to when there was a duty of care was 
mischaracterised as an immunity; and partly because the decision seemed to hold that 
Article 6 was not merely about access to courts but about the content of the substantive 
rights and obligations to be enforced there, contrary to previous decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights itself.64  Subsequently in Z v United Kingdom and TP 
and KM v United Kingdom ,65 the European Court of Human Rights backtracked on Article 
6 in a case about the liability of a local authority for failure to use statutory powers to 
rescue children who were suffering from appalling parental abuse and neglect.  The 
House of Lords had again held, in X v Bedfordshire County Council, 66 that it was not fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a delictual duty of care on the authority in this context. 
The European Court of Human Rights held that this was no infringement of Article 6, 
but was an infringement of Article 3 (right to protection against inhuman and degrading 
treatment).  This seems much more like the approach being taken in South Africa, albeit 
in a very different situation.  
But for South Africa Z shows how social welfare provision is also a context in 
which issues about rights to life, security and dignity can inform the delictual liability of 
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public authorities which fail to act.  On the specific facts of the case, Articles 28(1)(b), (c) 
and (d) – “every child has the right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when removed from the family environment; … to basic health care 
services and social services; to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or 
degradation” – would have applied.  Again, issues about the right to life and security may 
arise in contexts other than criminal behaviour: in the Scottish case of Gibson v Strathclyde 
Police,67 where the court held that the police could have a duty of care, not only in the 
context of their duty to investigate and suppress crime, but also in their civil functions: in 
casu, a failure to ensure the safety of road users where a road bridge had been swept away 
in a river flood and, as a consequence of the police withdrawing a guard at the bridging 
point, the victim had driven into the river and been drowned.
Looking again from South Africa back to the United Kingdom and Europe, the 
decisions in Carmichele and subsequent cases raise questions about whether Article 2 
ECHR (right to life) should have been applied in Osman.  While in Hill the unfortunate 
victim was simply a member of a very large class of women who were at some kind of 
risk in Yorkshire at the time of the Ripper episode, the threat was much more immediate 
and direct in Osman.  The two cases are readily distinguishable, in the way that, say, 
Saaiman, the cash-in-transit case, is distinguishable from Carmichele.  Certainly since Osman
the English courts have been sufficiently more willing to find a duty of care upon the 
police and other public authorities in similar situations where physical harm has resulted 
from negligent conduct, to make tenable the suggestion that Osman itself would now be 
decided differently in England.68
The argument is supported by the views of the Court of Appeal in the latest child 
abuse case against a local authority, JD v East Berkshire Community Health.69  The Court 
followed Z in finding the denial of a duty of care upon the health authority no breach of 
Article 6 ECHR; but that the authority of the House of Lords’ ruling in X v Bedfordshire 
County Council was significantly restricted by the subsequent case law, and, in relation to 
duties to the child affected (but not to the parent) could not survive the coming into 
force of the Human Rights Act on 2 October 2000.  Lord Phillips MR said:
Given the obligation of the local authority to respect a child’s Convention rights, 
the recognition of a duty of care to the child on the part of those involved should 
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not have a significantly adverse effect on the manner in which they perform their 
duties.  In the context of suspected child abuse, breach of a duty of care in 
negligence will frequently also amount to a violation of Article 3 or Article 8.  
The difference, of course, is that those asserting that wrongful acts or omissions 
occurred before October 2000 will have no claim under the Human Rights Act.  
This cannot, however, constitute a valid reason of policy for preserving a 
limitation of the common law duty of care  which is not otherwise justified.  On 
the contrary, the absence of an alternative remedy for children who were victims 
of abuse before October 2000 militates in favour of the recognition of a common 
law duty of care once the public policy reasons against this have lost their force.  
It follows that it will no longer be legitimate to rule that, as a matter of law, no 
common law duty of care is owed to a child in relation to the investigation of 
suspected child abuse and the initaiation and pursuit of care proceedings.  It is 
possible that there will be factual situations where it is not fair, just or reasonable 
to impose a duty of care, but each case will fall to be determined on its individual 
facts.  In reaching this decision we do not suggest that the common law duty of 
care will replicate the duty not to violate Articles 3 and 8.  Liability for breach of 
the latter duty and entitlement to compensation can arise in circumstances where 
the tort of negligence is not made out.  The area of factual enquiry where 
branches of the two duties are alleged are, however, likely to be the same.70
It remains to be seen whether the House of Lords will agree with this rewriting of the 
earlier decisions which hitherto they have been at some pains to defend.
A further dimension is the liability of public authorities in respect of the non-
physical interests of those with whom they deal.  In Western Cape Premier v Fair Cape 
Property Developers (Pty) Ltd,71 a property developer sought to recover damages for financial 
losses caused by allegedly negligent decision-making by the planning authorities.  
Although the SCA rejected the claim, the Constitution was nevertheless regarded as a 
relevant element in assessing the wrongfulness of the authority’s conduct: “the duties 
imposed on all organs of government by the Constitution, and in particular in the light of 
the positive obligations imposed by s 7 (the state must ‘respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’); and s 41(1) (all spheres of government and organs 
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of state must provide ‘effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government’).”72  
It is not clear, however, whether this invocation of the Constitution adds anything of 
substance to the reasoning of the court in the case.
A final general observation on the South African, British and European cases 
considered in this section is that they all possess a strong vertical dimension, as claims 
against such organs of the state as the police and local authorities, and are therefore by 
no means instances of pure horizontal application of human rights in the law of delict.  
What effect, if any, will the decisions have in genuinely horizontal cases between private 
parties?  Certainly an effect is possible: cases against public authorities have often in the 
past been leading ones in the law of negligence generally.73  Medical negligence cases are 
examples of ones which may hover in the zone between the vertical and the horizontal, 
as defendants may operate in either the public or private sector; but such cases will 
always tend to involve issues about rights to life and health, and human rights issues 
could therefore play some part in decisions.74  On the other hand, the SCA has rejected 
an argument that the right to protection of bodily integrity under Article 12(2) of the Bill 
of Rights requires a shift from fault-based to strict product liability, at least in relation to 
pharmaceuticals.75  And it is open to debate how far developments in the law of 
negligence can in any event go, without the need to make reference to human rights, 
albeit that the development would appear to be consistent with human rights.  Thus in 
England, despite earlier judicial observations about the possibility of an ECHR challenge 
on the basis of equality and access to a court,76 the House of Lords rid the law of the 
immunity of barristers from liability for their forensic conduct of litigation without taking 
the ECHR into account – in the case of Lord Hoffmann, explicitly so.77  But the case was 
decided in May 1999, before the Human Rights Act came into force,78 and, as Lord 
                                               
72 per Lewis AJA, para. 37.
73 In the UK see for example Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 and Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 
398 in relation to liability for pure economic loss; in South Africa, Minister van Polisi v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 
(A) (omissions) and Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) (negligent 
misrepresentation).
74 See generally G T Laurie, “Medical law and human rights: passing the parcel back to the profession?”, in 
Boyle et al (n. 1), 245-74, 343-4, for an overview extending well beyond negligence cases.
75 Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285.
76 Arthur J S Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 at 625 (para. 7), per Lord Bingham MR (now the 
Senior Law Lord).
77 Lord Hoffmann’s observation is to be found at ibid, 707D.  Lords Hope and Hutton, in forming a 
minority in favour of preserving the immunity in criminal cases, referred to the ECHR to show that their 
view was not inconsistent with Convention rights (at 718, 734).
78 On 2 October 2000.
18
Millett observed,79 had the House gone the other way on the issue, a fresh challenge 
based on Convention rights would have been inevitable.
An approach somewhat similar to that in the barristers’ immunity case can be 
found in the South African defamation case of National Media Ltd v Bogoshi,80 in which the 
SCA modified the strict liability of the press for defamation by creating a media defence 
of reasonable publication.81  This was done apparently without taking direct account of 
the Constitution, although Hefer JA, giving the opinion of the court, stated that he 
believed the decision to strike a proper balance between the constitutional values of the 
right to protect one’s reputation and the freedom of the press.82  But, as one 
commentator put it, “the Court appeared to be far more comfortable in relying on 
English and Australian cases and a Dutch author in developing our common law than on 
the Constitution … It is to be hoped that courts will grasp the opportunity and not give 
the impression that, where possible, the Constitution should be kept out of the realm of 
private law”.83  The better approach is, then, following the guidance of the Constitutional 
Court in Carmichele,84 not to change the common law and then compare the result with 
the Bill of Rights, but to assess the existing law in the light of the Constitution, and then 
change it if necessary and possible for the court, i.e. make the Constitution the explicit 
basis for developing the law.  Again, however, there are issues about the common law’s 
own internal mechanisms for change alongside those under the Constitution.85  In Bogoshi
the court introduced the defence of reasonable publication by deploying the concept of 
lawfulness, the general criterion of reasonableness based on considerations of fairness, 
morality, policy and the Court’s perception of the legal convictions of the community.   
This, as already observed in relation to the law of negligence, is a highly flexible 
instrument even without regard to the Constitution.  But what appears from Carmichele is 
that the Constitution should be fed in along with the other elements of the common law 
test; and presumably it should receive the greatest weight from the court in the event of 
any conflict.  
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However, the constitutionality of the development of the common law in Bogoshi 
has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Khumalo v Holomisa.86  Also at issue in 
this case was the constitutionality of the lack of a requirement that the defamatory 
statement be untrue (the plaintiff had not alleged that it was untrue, but the action had 
been allowed to proceed in the Transvaal High Court, in accordance with the common 
law).  This was said to be contrary to the right to freedom of expression (section 16 of 
the Constitution).  O’Regan J held that while freedom of expression was fundamental, it 
was not a paramount value.  It had to be construed  in the context of other values in the 
Constitution: here in particular, human dignity, freedom and equality, which was a 
“foundational” constitutional value.  The law of defamation existed to protect this 
interest; did it strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests?  Truth in 
the public interest was a defence but the onus was on the defendant, who had made the 
statement, to prove truth.  But truth is notoriously difficult to prove, and this burden was 
known to have a “chilling effect” on the publication of statements which might 
otherwise be in the public interest.  This had been much mediated by the Bogoshi
“reasonable publication” defence.  If the common law was to be changed to put the 
burden of proving untruth on the plaintiff, the result would be “zero-sum”, and a 
balance would not be struck between dignity and freedom of expression.  The Bogoshi
defence, on the other hand, did produce a balance, without involving either side in proof 
of truth or untruth, as the case might be.  Defamation defendants should be left with two 
defences – truth, or reasonable publication – which was not an unreasonable burden, 
even if the full meaning of “reasonable publication” had still to be fully worked out.  The 
SCA in Bogoshi had therefore come to the right balance in its result. 
A point of interest to a British lawyer in this case is the balancing of freedom of 
expression with the right to dignity, and the finding that the latter outweighs the former.  
In the United Kingdom freedom of expression has been accorded very high value by 
both the legislature and the courts.   The most notable instance is in the Human Rights 
Act 1998, under section 12 of which the courts are to have “particular regard” to the 
importance of freedom of expression where a party is seeking relief which may affect 
that right.  This was inserted in the Act during its Parliamentary passage at the behest of 
the media lobby, and it has been considered a number of times by the courts, particularly 
in cases relating to privacy, confidentiality and copyright.
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CONTRACT87
Contract presents more difficulties than delict in any discussion of the 
constitutionalisation of private law.  The law is founded on ideas of transactional 
equality, private autonomy, and voluntary inter-action, in which, within very broad limits, 
individuals strike their own balance of interests, rather than have it set for them by 
external, social or public standards.  Contracting parties know their own interests better 
than any government agency, and the cumulative pooling of individual interests which is 
represented by contracts, together with their internal, bargained-for, resolution of any 
conflicts which may have preceded the conclusion of a contract, is thus in the public 
interest as well.  It can be argued that this freedom of contract is itself a constitutionally 
protected right, as an aspect of human dignity and personal autonomy,88 although from a 
European perspective it should be noted that the ECHR contains no express 
commitment either to the freedom and sanctity of contract as a central value, or to the 
protection of consumers or employees as an aspect of prohibition of discrimination in its 
Article 14.
But this kind of thinking about and justification for individual autonomy and 
freedom of contract has long been the subject of criticism for its failure to recognise the 
realities of market power and the actual inequalities which exist between contracting 
parties, depriving them of any meaningful transactional equality; most notably, but not 
exclusively, in the cases of employees and consumers.  Some therefore see the 
constitutionalisation of private law as an opportunity to redress the balance in favour of 
the weaker party and of more general social values as reflected in the constitution, and to 
bring human rights to bear upon private as well as public power.  In general, however, 
the ECHR catalogue of rights, conceived in the aftermath of the Second World War and 
reflecting the concerns of its times, is insufficient to be a basis for a radical approach to 
contractual freedom.89  The ECHR may not enshrine, but neither does it derogate from, 
freedom and sanctity of contract, directly or indirectly; nor could anything in the text be 
used to compel parties to contract with each other,90 apart perhaps from the prohibition 
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on discrimination in Article 14.91  Section 1 of the South African Constitution, on the 
other hand, founds the republic on the values of “human dignity [and] the achievement 
of equality”.  The Bill of Rights provides in Article 9 that no person may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more of the grounds of race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth, while Article 10 
declares that “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected”.  These provisions are capable of use in contractual contexts, since they 
are applicable to private relationships.  Thus Article 9 was used by Louw J to interpret 
the word “family” in an insurance contract as including a long-term homosexual 
partnership in Farr v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd,92 while Articles 9 and 10 were 
deployed by Van Zyl J to develop new purchaser remedies in the common law relating to 
the trade-in of motor cars in Janse van Rensburg v Griewe Trust.93  Most striking of all, 
inasmuch as it is a decision compelling parties to contract with each other, is Hoffmann v 
South African Airways,94 where the airline’s policy of not employing HIV-positive persons 
as cabin attendants was held by the Constitutional Court to infringe both Articles 9 and 
10, and it was also ordered to employ such a person who had passed all the other 
requirements for the position. 
Can human rights go further in addressing issues of inequality in contract, in 
particular substantive transactional inequalities producing unfair contracts?  In Germany, 
broad concepts of good faith and public policy (good morals) found in the BGB “are 
considered the entrance gates through which constitutional values may gain access to the 
private law sphere”, including contract.95  The best-known example is the 1993 decision 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court)96 in a case where a 21-year old 
woman earning DM1100 per month gave a guarantee to a bank in respect of her father’s 
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business debts, which extended to DM2 million.  The court held that for the 
Bundesgerichtshof to find the daughter liable under the guarantee was a violation of the 
general liberty clause (article 2) of the Basic Law.  While the clause guaranteed private 
autonomy for citizens in managing their social, economic and legal transactions with 
others,  there has been no such autonomy if there has been a structural imbalance in 
negotiating power between the parties, and the civil courts have the constitutional duty to 
take account of this when called upon to invalidate the contract on the ground of 
immorality or bargaining in bad faith.  In other words, in unequal contracts the 
“radiating” effect of the Basic Law was to be given effect through the appropriate open-
ended norms applying to contract law, i.e. § § 138 (good morals) and 242 (good faith) of 
the BGB.97  
The ability of South African law to make similar use of open-ended norms of 
contract law such as good faith, public policy and rationality is somewhat uncertain 
because, firstly, the existence and scope of such norms is disputed.98  Thus in a study of 
good faith published in 1999, Dale Hutchison concluded:
[I]t seems reasonably clear that South African law has no general doctrine of 
good faith.  By that I mean that good faith is not an independent or free-floating 
principle that the courts can employ directly to justify intervention in contractual 
relationships on the grounds of unreasonableness or unfairness. … [G]ood faith 
may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle, based on community 
standards of decency and fairness, that underlies and informs the substantive law 
of contract.  It finds expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines 
their form, content and field of application and provides them with a moral and 
theoretical foundation.  Good faith thus has a creative, a controlling and a 
legitimating or explanatory function.  It is not, however, the only value or 
principle that underlies the law of contract. … [T]he influence of good faith in 
the law of contract is merely of an indirect nature, in that the concept is usually if 
not always mediated by some other, more technical doctrinal device.  Thus, for 
example, while good faith does not empower a court directly to supplement the 
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terms of a contract, or to limit their operation, it might in appropriate cases 
enable the court to achieve these same results indirectly, through the use of 
devices such as implied terms and the public policy rule.99
But there were also one or two judges prepared to go further than this.  In Eerste 
Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO,100 the facts of which were 
comparable in some respects to the German guarantee case described earlier, a sick old 
woman stood as surety to a bank for the debts of her son.  The woman’s daughter was 
subsequently appointed her curatrix and obtained an order from the court that the 
suretyship was unenforceable.  The majority decided the case on the basis of the 
woman’s lack of capacity, but Olivier JA founded his concurring decision squarely on a 
doctrine of good faith.  In Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat101 Davis J argued that the 
constitutional obligation to develop the common law in accordance with the rights of 
equality and dignity required the courts to establish an active doctrine of good faith; a 
view which prompted Hutchison to comment:
[T]o reach directly for the baton of good faith would be to confess to a want of 
technical expertise or creativity.  Palm-tree justice no doubt has its virtues, but as 
lawyers we should adhere to the ideal of justice according to law.102
In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes,103 the Appellate Division appeared to extend the 
concept of public policy widely to regulate unfair or unconscionable contract terms.  In 
the leading judgment, Smalberger JA said:104
Our common law does not recognise agreements that are contrary to public 
policy. … Agreements which are clearly inimical to the interests of the 
community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter to social 
or economic expedience, will accordingly, on the grounds of public policy, not be 
enforced. … The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, 
however, be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty 
as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of 
the power. … In grappling with this often difficult problem it must be borne in 
mind that public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, and 
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requires that commercial transactions should not be unduly trammelled by 
restrictions on that freedom. … A further relevant, and not unimportant, 
consideration is that public policy should properly take into account the doing of 
simple justice between man and man.
If this seemed to herald a judicial approach less cautious than that to good faith, the 
caveat of Smalberger JA about public policy also favouring freedom of contract must 
nevertheless be borne in mind.  It is therefore notable that the use of public policy as a 
way of tackling unconscionable contracts seems to have fallen into disfavour in recent 
years,105 although arguments based on this approach continue to be made both in court 
and commentary.106
Nevertheless, the SCA confirmed twice in 2002 that public policy in contract is 
now rooted in the Constitution and the fundamental values that it enshrines.107  But the 
actual decisions in these cases have been criticised for being insufficiently radical in their 
approach to contractual freedom.108  In Brisley v Drotsky109 the SCA held that the common 
law Shifren doctrine – an entrenchment clause in a contract providing that all 
amendments to the contract had to comply with specified formalities is binding110 –
remained in force, even although the contract in question (a lease) and the clause were 
embodied in a standard form purchased by the landlord in a shop, and were never the 
subject of negotiation, disclosure or legal advice between the parties.111  The landlord was 
seeking to evict the tenant for breaches of the lease conditions, although previously he 
had taken no action in response to similar breaches by the tenant and might therefore, 
without the Shifren clause, have been taken to have accepted an implicit variation of the 
lease.  The Court rejected an argument that the principle of good faith could prevent 
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invocation of the Shifren clause because it was in all the circumstances unreasonable, 
unfair and contrary to good faith.  The judgment of Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank
was disapproved.  The court accepted Dale Hutchison’s understanding of the 
legitimating and explanatory role of good faith, but observed that this did not override 
other important considerations such as freedom of contract.  The dictum of Smalberger 
JA in Sasfin, also quoted above, was to similar effect with regard to public policy.  
The court also did not take Hutchison’s preferred, rule-based, route - “limiting 
the Shifren principle, possibly by recognizing exceptional circumstances where the 
principle will not apply, certainly by employing and developing concepts such as waiver, 
estoppel and pactum de non petendo”112 - to implementing constitutional values in this 
particular context.  There are however notable passages in the judgment of Cameron JA 
in Brisley, affirming the application of the Constitution in contract law, but arguing for 
“perceptive restraint”113 in this process, and concluding: “The Constitution requires that 
its values be employed to achieve a careful balance between the unacceptable excesses of 
contractual ‘freedom’, and securing a framework within which the ability to contract 
enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and dignity.”114   
In Afrox Healthcare v Strydom,115 an exclusion clause in a hospital treatment 
contract was challenged as contrary to public policy and good faith by a patient who had 
suffered irreparable harm in a hospital operation as a result of a nurse’s negligence in 
dressing his wounds.  The challenge was dismissed, the court finding that the contractual 
relationship was not an unequal one, that good faith was not in itself a ground for 
invalidating contracts,116 and that the clause did not promote negligent conduct contrary 
to the respondent’s constitutional right of access to health care; other factors, such as the 
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hospital’s need to maintain its professional reputation, would enure to promote the right 
to health.  Moreover freedom of contract had to be taken into account.117
Although the case does not involve any direct reference to the Constitution, it is 
also worth noting another decision of the SCA about exclusion clauses, Van der 
Westhuizen v Arnold.118  A contract for the sale of a car provided that “no warranty 
whatsoever has been or is given to [the buyer] by the seller or his agent(s)”.  Negotiations 
had made both parties aware of the car’s need for repairs.  After the buyer took delivery, 
a bank claimed ownership of the car; the buyer paid it off, and then claimed from the 
seller, who pleaded the exclusion clause.  The SCA held that the clause was inapplicable 
to the warranty of title, which arose ex lege rather than ex consensu, and to which the 
exclusion was not intended to apply.  Lewis AJA considered, but rejected, the possibility 
that special rules of interpretation applied to exclusion clauses, and based her conclusion 
upon interpretation in the light of the surrounding circumstances.  The case thus 
illustrates Hutchison’s preferred approach of working towards the result that good faith 
might seem to demand, but through existing, more specific and precise rules of contract 
law.119
There have been no discussions of human rights in contract in the United 
Kingdom courts to compare with these South African cases.  So far as concerns unfair 
terms in standard form contracts, the reason for the lack of discussion is quite clear: the 
United Kingdom already has legislation in place on this subject, passed long before the 
Human Rights Act, and giving the judges power to regulate clauses by way of tests of 
reasonableness (the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977) and good faith (the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations which implement an EC Directive of 1993120).  Some 
kinds of clause – e.g. exclusions of liability for death or personal injury,121 exclusions of 
liability to consumers for defective goods, exclusions of the warranty of title in any sale 
of goods122 – are made void altogether, so that the Afrox and Westhuizen cases would have 
been unproblematic in the United Kingdom. Standard form contracts such as those in 
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Brisley v Drotsky would be subject to a reasonableness text under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act.123  There are also specific judicial controls over a number of particular types 
of consumer contract and transaction: distance selling,124 extortionate credit bargains,125
and package holidays,126 for example.  So there is generally no need, at least for 
consumers, to resort to Convention rights in pursuit of contractual fairness, even if that 
were possible.  Further, under the Unfair Terms Regulations a public official, the 
Director General of Fair Trading, is given a roving role in the regulation of standard 
terms in consumer contracts, and since 1999 a number of other consumer protection 
organisations, not all in the public sector, have also enjoyed powers of the same kind.127
One case from the United Kingdom courts shows that human rights may have 
unexpected effects on consumer protection legislation, however.  In Wilson v The First 
County Trust Ltd,128 the statutory provision in issue was s. 127(3) of the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974 (a United Kingdom statute), under which the court could not enforce an 
otherwise regulated consumer credit agreement where there was no document containing 
all the prescribed terms of the agreement signed by the debtor.  Securities related to the 
loan were also unenforceable.  W’s loan agreement, which she had signed, misstated the 
amount of the credit given, so both it and a related security over her BMW car were 
unenforceable.  The Court of Appeal took the view that this was a disproportionate 
response, given the absence of prejudice to any party in the misstatement and having 
regard to the creditor’s Convention rights under Article 6 (right to a hearing) and the 
First Protocol Article 1 (no deprivation of possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to law).  While the policy aim, as determined from the legislative history of the 
1974 Act, was legitimate, the means of achieving its goals was disproportionate and 
inflexible in disabling the court from consideration of all the factors in a case.  
If this decision was correct, it had major implications, not just for the Consumer 
Credit Act, but also in general for the legislative consumer protection technique of 
making void certain types of term in contracts.129  But the decision was overturned by the 
House of Lords in July 2003.130  The primary ground for the reversal was that the facts 
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and circumstances of the case had arisen before 2 October 2000, when the Human 
Rights Act 1998 came into force; and while the Act could be applied to legislation passed 
before that date, it contained no provision enabling such application retrospectively in 
relation to activities before that date.  However the House did also consider whether the 
provisions of the Consumer Credit Act were compliant with Convention rights.   Article 
6 was held not to apply, because it did not affect the content of civil rights and 
obligations, only the availability of a tribunal in which to determine them (Z was cited 
here).  The court was not barred from considering whether or not s. 127 applied; but 
could not enforce any agreement to which the section was held to apply.  But Article 1 of 
the First Protocol ECHR was engaged by the inability of the lender to enforce its security 
rights as a result of s. 127: “The lender’s rights were extinguished in favour of the 
borrower by legislation for which the state is responsible.  This was a deprivation of 
possessions within the meaning of Article 1.”131  However, what had to be shown was 
that the legislator’s response to the problem with which it was confronted failed to 
balance the public interest and the protection of property interests, and was 
disproportionate:
Parliament is charged with the primary responsibility for deciding whether the 
means chosen to deal with a social problem are both necessary and appropriate.  
Assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the various legislative 
alternatives is primarily a matter for Parliament.  The possible existence of 
alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified 
… The court will reach a different conclusion from the legislature only when it is 
apparent that the legislature has attached insufficient importance to a person’s 
Convention right.  The readiness of a court to depart from the views of the 
legislature depends upon the circumstances, one of which is the subject matter of 
the legislation.  The more the legislation concerns matters of broad social policy, 
the less ready will be a court to intervene.132
The House emphasised the legislature’s experience from prior legislation and the views 
of the high-powered committee which had proposed the Act, and concluded that the 
sanction imposed was one Parliament was entitled to use.133
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A final point from the United Kingdom perspective is the capacity of the 
common law of contract to develop even without the prompt provided by human rights.  
In England, protection of a guarantor against the unfair pressure resulting from a close 
personal relationship with the person whose debts were being guaranteed was achieved
by the House of Lords in 1994 through the equitable doctrine of constructive notice in 
Barclays Bank v O’Brien,134 and the uncertainties to which this gave rise, especially for the 
professional advisers of guarantors and for the prospective beneficiaries of the 
guarantees (usually banks), were addressed by the House by the provision of a very 
detailed set of guidelines in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge.135  In Scotland, the House of 
Lords followed O’Brien in 1997, but took the doctrinal route of “the broad principle in 
the field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith”,136 the equity of constructive notice 
being unknown to Scots law.  The use of the principle in this way was something of an 
innovation in Scottish contract law because, as in South African law, good faith is 
generally an underlying principle of an explanatory and legitimating rather than an active 
or creative nature.137  But in subsequent decisions the Scottish courts have preferred to 
continue to use this broad principle rather than adopt the detailed guidance found in 
Etridge,138 and it remains to be seen whether, encouraged by the use of the principle in 
EU-inspired legislation such as that on unfair terms in consumer contracts,139 good faith 
will move beyond the realm of personal guarantees into other areas of contract law; and, 
if so, whether Convention rights will play any part in rendering more specific the 
application of the general concept.  English law, on the other hand, remains resolutely 
against the adoption of any general principle of good faith outside the areas where it is 
used in legislation: the preferred approach is “to avoid any commitment to over-riding 
principle in favour of piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness”.140
It may also be noted that both Scots and English law suffer from what has been 
termed a “hardening of the categories” in respect of the role of public policy in contract 
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law,141 and it is certainly possible that here Convention rights may play some part in 
opening up what is presently a quiescent area.  On the other hand, in employment 
contracts the courts in both countries, aided by academic writers, have not needed the 
stimulus of Convention rights to develop the doctrine of mutual trust and confidence to 
create rights and duties for both employers and employees,142 while Lord Hoffmann has 
led the way towards the adoption of more subjective methods of interpreting contracts143
– with results that have occasionally surprised their progenitor.144  
DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW: JUDGES AS LAW-MAKERS UNDER A 
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
In Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council,145 the House of Lords rid English law of a 
defence to a restitutionary (enrichment) claim which had existed at common law for 
nearly 200 years,146 that of mistake of law.  To reach this result the House needed no help 
from the ECHR, the entry into domestic enforceability of which still lay two years ahead.  
Instead the court had to discuss the conundrum arising where, as in the case before it, 
the mistake of law was the result of a judicial decision post-dating the payment recovery 
of which was being sought under the restitutionary claim.147  If that post-payment 
decision was merely declaratory, so that previous understandings of the law were wrong 
(the view of the majority in Kleinwort), then the payment was indeed made under mistake; 
but if the decision changed the law (the minority view), then there was no mistake at the 
time of payment, but only a misprediction as to what the law on the subject would be 
once the courts finally determined it.  The view of the majority took the classical 
approach to the question of what judges do in the common law; the view of the minority 
characterised the classical approach as “a fairy tale in which no-one any longer believes”, 
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and its own understanding as “common sense”.148  In effect, the view of the majority 
attributed retrospective effect to judicial determinations of the law.  On the other hand, 
while the minority agreed that the mistake of law rule was bad and should be changed, 
they took the view that this was a change to be made by the legislature and not the 
courts, since otherwise there would be considerable uncertainty about the limitation 
period to be applied and consequential damage to certainty in commercial and other 
transactions.  In other words, the ramifications of the decision and its effect on cases of a 
kind other than that before the court were too complex to be susceptible to a purely 
judicial change of the law.  
Legislating for the application of human rights in the common law relating to 
private relationships and transactions raises similar issues about how to characterise
judicial power in the shaping of the common law, and the limits, if any, on that power 
where human rights questions are engaged.  It is clear that both the Bill of Rights and the 
Human Rights Act enable the South African and British judges respectively to “develop” 
the law.  But what is the ambit, the reach, the scope, of this power of development?  To 
what extent is it trammelled by the classical idea that the judge’s function is to declare 
and apply the law, and that it is for the legislature to change the law if judicial decision-
making leads to results deemed politically, socially or otherwise unacceptable?  What 
about the retrospective effect of judicial “developments” in the law resulting from the 
application of human rights?
The declaratory theory of the common law should not be mistaken for one of 
stasis.  Kleinwort Benson makes this clear: the declaratory majority ejected the mistake of 
law defence from the English law of restitution.  Of the majority, Lord Goff gave the 
fullest explanation of his position.149  The judge is essentially deciding the case before 
him (or her), and the law determined and applied by the judge in that particular set of 
circumstances should be capable of application in all “congruent” cases in future 
(whenever their circumstances arose).  The “interstitial” development of the common 
law thus occurs principally through the ever-changing and variable facts of the cases to 
be decided by the courts, and the subsequent use of decisions on these facts as 
precedents once it is decided in a later case that they are “congruent”.  In the pursuit of 
this incremental development of the common law, the judge may further have regard to 
academic writing, comparative law and “the perceived interests of justice”.  Lord Goff 
also recognises the possibility of more major departures in the judicial development of 
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the law, but not does not throw much light on when and how this may occur.  However, 
if we take the law of restitution, with which his judgment was actually concerned, we can 
see that the major departure in Kleinwort Benson was permissible because earlier case law of 
the House had drawn together the precedents on the law of restitution under the 
principle of unjust enrichment,150 and “a blanket rule of non-recovery [such as the 
mistake of law rule], irrespective of the justice of the case, cannot sensibly survive in a 
rubric of the law based on the principle of unjust enrichment”.151  The mistake of law 
rule was itself a mistake which occurred because the basic principle in the law had not 
been identified at the time it was introduced.  Thus Kleinwort Benson was part of a 
realignment of principle which had already begun to be effected by the courts as part of 
the legitimate exercise of their law-development function.
Lord Goff’s analysis of judicial law-making within the essentially declaratory 
system of the common law aligns him in many ways with other great common law judges 
such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo and Lord Atkin, all of whom 
recognised and deployed the power of the judge to reformulate the law not only by way 
of analogical reasoning from precedent, but also in terms of wider principles identified as 
underlying these precedents viewed as a whole.152  Each made use of perceptions of 
justice in this process, and each had his own way of identifying justice and what it 
required in the case before them and for the development of the law.  Although the 
former South African Chief Justice, Michael Corbett, has spoken of the need for the 
judiciary to identify and reflect the common norms and values of the community in 
which the law applies, and to become “the living voice of the people”153 in developing 
the law, a more prosaic view would be that the judge in search of the direction to take in 
moving the law on is most likely to be comfortable with the guidance to be found in legal 
sources.  Lord Goff refers to academic writing and comparative law, and Chief Justice 
Corbett would also have done so.  Other aids to finding the right path can include the 
work of the legislature, with existing legislation showing the preferred policy route, or the 
work of official law reform bodies such as Law Commissions showing that the existing 
law is in need of reform.  Sometimes, the inaction of the legislation on a particular matter 
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may suggest that policy is against change in the law.  And finally, in both South Africa 
and the United Kingdom  there are now in addition the human rights instruments.154  
Chief Justice Barak of Israel has argued that human rights work within the old 
private law, imbuing old tools with new contents or creating new tools with traditional 
private law techniques, and enabling the court to grant a remedy that would not have 
been previously available.  Where private law cannot develop further within its own 
structures, the legislature has the responsibility to fill the gap; although, for the judiciary, 
this leaves the question of what to do when the legislature does not act.155  If we consider
what the South African courts have done to develop the common law as a result of the 
application of the Bill of Rights, we can see that there has been movement, principally in 
the law of delict, but it is movement within the existing structures of, and underlying 
ideas of what is possible for, the common law.  In Carmichele, for example, the 
Constitutional Court took a traditional approach in cautioning the judges to be mindful 
of the fact that the major engine for law reform should be the legislature and not the 
judiciary.156  The police liability cases represent, not so much a change in the principles or 
rules of delict, but more a recognition that the reasons for confining the operation of 
these principles in a particular context were now outweighed by other considerations, 
flowing in particular from the Constitution.  In some ways, more significant changes to 
the substance of legal rules as such have occurred in the law of defamation, with the 
introduction of the reasonable publication defence, 157 and also the restoration of the 
amende honorable, 158 which earlier appeared to have fallen into desuetude.  On the other 
hand, the courts have refused to introduce strict product liability,159 or, in the law of 
contract, an active doctrine of good faith to control unfair terms.160  In the former case, 
the court was concerned that the future actions of the legislature might be unduly 
hamstrung by a declaration that the Constitution required a strict products liability 
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regime, in particular in the field of pharmaceuticals, so critical to the highly political 
problem of access to drugs in South African health care.
On the whole, the decisions of the South African courts in these matters seem to 
me both to illustrate Chief Justice Barak’s point and to be soundly based in terms of the 
limits of judicial power as assessed by Lord Goff and his great predecessors.  Strict 
liability for products and control of unfair contract terms involve complex issues of 
policy better regulated by the legislature than by courts responding to the hard facts of 
particular cases which may or may not be representative of an overall problem.  In the 
United Kingdom  and the European Union, unfair contract terms and strict product 
liability have both been the subject of detailed legislation.161  In South Africa, there is a 
Law Commission report on unfair contract terms, submitted in 1998 and over 200 pages 
long, but upon which the legislature has not yet chosen to act.162  What is the 
significance, if any, of this inaction for a court deciding whether or not to introduce 
controls based on the principle of good faith?  What significance should be attached to 
the deep divisions of opinion on the subject amongst Law Commission consultees?  The 
draft Bill appended to the report has 26 guidelines on how to determine whether a 
contract is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive; can a court create such 
guidelines on the basis of the case before it?163  Should the protection be applicable to all 
contracts, as the Law Commission proposes, or confined to standard form and/or 
consumer contracts, as would be the case in many other jurisdictions?  It looks like a 
subject inapt for merely judicial reform, albeit that the judges can use some of the 
existing, less general, rules of contract law to overcome some of the apparent difficulties 
in particular cases. 
What of the United Kingdom?  In general, there has been little development of 
the law of delict, and none at all to speak of in the law of contract, that can be attributed 
to the impact or influence of Convention rights.164  As with the South African police 
cases, Convention rights have forced a reconsideration, not yet complete, of the 
application of existing general principles of negligence to the liability of public authorities 
in a number of contexts; but the general principles themselves remain unaffected by this 
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process.  Contract law is already developed in a number of areas that might otherwise be 
relevant for Convention rights, as a result of both legislation and judicial decision pre-
dating the coming into force of the Human Rights Act.  It is not clear, for the moment, 
that in these areas further development of the law is required.
The area which has proved problematic in the United Kingdom is the protection 
of privacy.  One anticipated effect of the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 
was judicial reconsideration in the light of Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy) of the 
previous denial by the English courts of such a right.165  And indeed there has been a 
considerable amount of litigation on the subject since 2 October 2000; litigation which 
incidentally has assumed rather than argued out the issue of horizontality of Convention 
rights under the Human Rights Act, but has not definitively clarified the nature of the 
horizontality.  There has been no declaration that English law now recognises a general 
right of privacy.  Instead, what has happened has been the gradual extension of the law 
of breach of confidence into areas where previously it would have had no place.166  The 
main extensions can be summarised thus: (1) the widening scope of the information 
recognised as confidential, the assessment of which includes the impact of the form of the 
proposed publication, the test being whether the disclosure would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities and would shock the conscience (rather than 
the more privacy-oriented approach of asking whether the information fell within the 
private sphere); and (2) there may be an obligation of confidentiality even although the 
information was not really imparted in a relation of confidence.  It is the latter which 
pushes the developing tort of breach of confidence closest to a privacy action.167
However, as Lindsay J pointed out in Douglas v Hello!,168 one of the leading 
examples of this extension of breach of confidence, “further development by the courts 
may merely be awaiting the first post-Human Rights Act case where neither the law of 
confidence nor any other domestic law protects an individual who deserves 
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protection”.169  Lindsay J drew attention to the latest European Court of Human Rights 
case on the subject, Peck v United Kingdom , decided on 28 January 2003,170 in which P’s 
Article 8 rights were held to have been infringed by a local authority’s publication of 
closed circuit TV camera pictures of him carrying a knife in a public street.  The context 
in which this had occurred, however, was P’s attempt to commit suicide by slashing his 
wrists with the knife while suffering from clinical depression.  The authority’s publication 
of the material had been intended to show how the use of CCTV could deal with 
dangerous situations – the police had been prompted to arrest P after sighting the images 
– but the publicity failed to disguise P’s identity.  Lindsay J added:
[Peck] shows that in circumstances where the law of confidence did not operate 
our domestic law has already been held to be inadequate.  That inadequacy will 
have to be made good and if Parliament does not step in then the courts will be 
obliged to. 171   
Nevertheless, the House of Lords has now ruled that, at any rate before 2 
October 2000, English law did not have a general tort of invasion of privacy although the 
case in question was not covered even by the extended action for breach of confidence. 
The alleged invasion in Wainwright v Home Office172 was strip-searches of visitors to a 
prison by prison officers, which went beyond what was allowed under (non-statutory) 
prison rules, and caused emotional distress to one victim and post-traumatic stress 
disorder to the other, a young man with physical and learning difficulties. The purpose 
of the searches was the detection of drugs being smuggled into the prison for prisoners, a 
major problem in British prisons.  Although the case is thus concerned with a very 
specific situation, the speech of Lord Hoffmann is clearly intended to be of wider scope.  
Thus, although the facts of Wainwright occurred before 2 October 2000, Lord Hoffmann 
expresses the obiter view that Article 8 was not infringed by the strip-search unless the 
harm done by the invasion of privacy was inflicted intentionally.  He also suggests that 
Peck v United Kingdom showed, not that English law failed to protect privacy, but that a 
system of control of CCTV cameras was needed to protect the sensitivities of persons 
whose image was captured by the all-seeing lens. This, he went on, required the detailed 
approach of legislation rather than the broad brush of common law principle. A number 
of the other cases in which it had been held that English law did not protect privacy had 
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been dealt with subsequently by way of legislation: telephone tapping by the Interception 
of Communications Act 1985, “stalking” through the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997, police surveillance by the Police Act 1997.  In addition there was the Data 
Protection Act 1998, regulating the processing of personal data and providing a civil 
action against misuse.  Privacy was too protean a concept to lend itself to other than this 
kind of detailed protection, together with an appropriate range of exceptions, which 
could be achieved only by statutory provision.
It is not altogether clear where this decision leaves the law with regard to events 
after 2 October 2000; the Human Rights Act means that there is a statutory remedy 
against invasions of privacy by a public authority (i.e. in vertical cases), but Lord 
Hoffmann is careful to avoid “pre-emption” of “the controversial question of the extent, 
if any, to which the Convention requires the state to provide remedies for invasions of 
privacy by persons who are not public authorities”,173 (i.e. in horizontal cases).  The 
House of Lords may have the opportunity to consider that question when they hear 
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers,174 a case between a private individual and a newspaper 
(the Press not being a public body).  Here the privacy issues are the publication of 
personal information and surreptitiously taken photographs; for the newspaper there is 
also an issue about Press freedom of expression, since it published the information to 
counter untrue publicity about herself put about by Campbell.  The case so far has 
proceeded on the basis of breach of confidence.175  The House may be faced with the 
question of whether the law in this area has moved so far to take account of Article 8 
ECHR that it should be re-labelled invasion of privacy, with breach of confidence being 
returned to its narrower former ambit; and if so, whether this newly developed tort 
should be confined to media intrusions upon private life, or left potentially wide enough 
to reach the wholly different problems illustrated by the Wainwright case.  Lord 
Hoffmann’s speech will make it very difficult to take the latter step; and he also expresses 
some doubts about the former.176
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Wainwright is therefore, despite the fact that it deals with facts before 2 October 
2000, a demonstration of the difficulties some, and perhaps most, English judges will feel 
in using Article 8 ECHR to develop the common law to create a general obligation to 
respect individual privacy.  In part, these difficulties stem from the view that, like good 
faith in contract, or strict liability in delict, privacy is so multi-faceted that generalisation 
by judges arising from particular cases is dangerous, and that the responsibility should fall 
on the legislature.  Where the legislature wishes to act to protect privacy, it has done so.  
In the case of media intrusion, the Government has clearly wished not to intervene 
directly, but rather to encourage and support Press and broadcaster self-regulation 
through voluntary codes, while the Human Rights Act itself seeks to privilege freedom of 
expression amongst human rights by requiring courts to have “particular regard” for its 
importance.177  It is not for the judges to undo that approach by developing sweeping 
common law regulation where none or little existed before.  
One may also detect in Wainwright the traditional English suspicion of general 
principles and the preference for regulating specific problems piecemeal.  Lord 
Bingham’s rejection of good faith on those grounds has already been noted;178 and even
after a general principle is identified, as in the case of negligence, the courts often 
develop it only incrementally and within established categories of cases.179  Privacy, as 
with other interests, is protected, but in pockets of liability rather than in general.  There 
is too a hint of English law being founded on freedoms rather than rights, when Lord 
Hoffmann rejects the relevance of the breach by the prison officers of the non-statutory 
prison rules on strip searches: “the acts of the prison officers needed statutory authority 
only if they would otherwise have been wrongful, that is to say, tortious or in breach of 
statutory duty.”180  
The apparent conclusion that strip searching is not a wrong unless made so by 
positive law is however surprising if the prison saw fit to regulate the practice by its own 
internal rules; and one might also ask questions about the Wainwrights’ freedom not to 
be intimately touched by others.  As Lord Hoffmann rightly says, “having to take off 
your clothes in front of a couple of prison officers is not to everyone’s taste”;181 even less 
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so is then having your private parts fingered and handled by the officers in question.  
The surprise is all the greater in a legal system which takes a more generalised approach 
to delictual liability than that apparent in Wainwright.  In the pre-Human Rights Act 
Scottish case of Henderson v Chief Constable of Fife,182 Mrs Henderson was in police custody, 
subject to a lawful detention; but the police, following a normal practice for which there 
was no statutory authority, required her to remove her bra while she remained in a police 
cell.  This was to prevent her using the garment to harm herself, even although there was 
no indication of any danger of this being at all likely in the particular situation.  Lord 
Jauncey held that the police action was a clear invasion of Mrs Henderson’s liberty 
without justification, from which it followed that she had a remedy in damages.  He 
continued:
I should perhaps add that the researches of counsel had disclosed no Scottish 
case in which it had been held that removal of clothing forcibly or by 
requirement could constitute a wrong but since such removal must amount to an 
infringement of liberty I see no reason why the law should not protect the 
individual from this infringement.  … I consider that an award of £300 would 
fairly reflect the invasion of privacy and liberty which Mrs Henderson suffered as 
a result of having to remove her brassiere.183
Apart from this case and its clear contrast in approach with that of Lord Hoffmann in 
Wainwright, however, modern Scots law has been non-committal on the subject of 
privacy, although in an unreported case in 1957 Lord Justice Clerk Thomson said: “I 
know of no authority to the effect that mere invasion of privacy however hurtful and 
whatever its purpose and however repugnant to good taste is itself actionable.”184  
The law of South Africa clearly takes a much more generalised approach to 
delictual liability which by way of the actio injuriarum achieved the protection of privacy, 
founded upon the concept of individual dignitas, long before the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights.185  It seems clear that a person’s naked body is regarded as part of their “inner 
sanctum”, not to be intruded upon by others intentionally or with animus injuriandi
(consciousness of wrongfulness).  That animus is presumed if the invasion of privacy is 
proved; strict liability is imposed if the wrong affects the liberty of the subject.  There are 
defences such as statutory authority and, perhaps, following the Bogoshi case, 
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reasonableness.  This is now reinforced186 by the constitutional protection of dignity and 
privacy, which includes a prohibition upon searching the person, although this may be 
subject to justification under the limitations clause.187  
The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset 
of interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing 
to another citizen.  In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the 
inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and 
home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the 
community.  This implies that community rights and the rights of fellow 
members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the 
abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil 
society.  Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person 
moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social 
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.188
The Constitution does however mean that searching of a person must have a legal basis, 
which in turn must respect the limits created by the Constitution.189  It has been 
suggested that to be constitutionally valid laws giving power to search must define the 
power and provide for appropriate prior authorisation.190  Fault is not a requirement for 
an invasion of the constitutional right to privacy.
Long ago T B Smith suggested that the principles of the actio injuriarum might be a 
basis in Scots law for challenging “the infliction of affront upon an individual by 
invading his privacy”.191  When he was a Scottish Law Commissioner, the Commission 
put forward a comparison with South African law in this respect.192  But there have been 
few signs of any subsequent development of this comparative nature by the Scottish 
courts.  In April 2003, however, arguments based upon the actio injuriarum were deployed 
in a case concerned with the admissibility of evidence procured by private investigators 
through intrusions upon an individual’s privacy contrary to Article 8 ECHR, by way of 
unasked-for visits to his home and surveillance of his house from a neighbouring 
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property.193  Counsel for the pursuer argued that the court had a duty to develop the 
existing law to be compatible with the ECHR, and that the actio injuriarum provided a 
basis for protection of privacy in Scots law.  Counsel for the defenders, referring to 
Reinhard Zimmermann’s book on the law of obligations194 and the Digest, argued that 
the principles of the actio injuriarum were not wide enough to cover privacy in general, but 
only attacks on personality for an unlawful purpose.  The purpose of the surveillance 
here, to discover whether or not the party being watched was truly suffering from the 
injury for which he was claiming damages in a delict action, was not unlawful.  Lord 
Bonomy merely recorded the submissions made on this point, however, and decided the 
case on other grounds, giving little support to any development of the law in this 
particular way.
In conclusion, the judicial power to develop the common law in the light of 
human rights protection depends, not only on the factors which have traditionally, and 
quite properly, hemmed in the judges, such as respect for the legislature and recognition 
of the limits of their own vision of policy, but also on the legal culture in which the 
judges themselves have operated.  The contrast between the general English and the 
South African legal cultures can be seen, not only in the privacy cases just discussed, but 
also in the reluctance of the English courts (or at least the House of Lords) to take on 
board the full implications of the ECHR with regard to the negligence liability of public 
authorities, whereas the South African judges appear to have made much more decisive 
moves.  Nor are privacy and negligence the only examples of this English reluctance: as 
Conor Gearty has remarked of the approach in criminal law, “at times it has seemed as 
though the operating assumption has been that the Human Rights Act 1998 must be 
interpreted ‘as far as possible’ to be compatible with pre-existing law, rather than the 
other way round”.195  Much of this difference between South Africa and England has to 
do with the very different social, political and economic realities in which the two 
systems took human rights on board; but it is a fair question whether the English 
approach has always reached the right conclusions.  In particular, while the Wainwright
case may or may not be rightly decided as a matter of the law applying in England before 
2 October 2000, it is submitted that it cannot govern the result on facts arising after that 
date.  The right approach then will be to ask whether the private sphere of persons such
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as the Wainwrights has been invaded (answer, surely, yes) and, taking into account 
Article 8’s self-limitation to allow for “the prevention of disorder or crime, protection of 
health or morals [and protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as well as the 
Human Rights Act’s privileging of freedom of expression against other Convention 
rights,196 whether that invasion was justified in the whole circumstances of the case.
And what of the Scots?  The legal culture of Scotland, at least when it comes to 
judicial development of the law and the approach to general principles, is probably closer 
to that of England than that of modern South Africa, despite the neo-Civilian crusade of 
T B Smith and others to make it otherwise.197  But, as shown by the contrast between the 
case of Henderson and the decision in Wainwright, acculturation has by no means reached 
the point of complete assimilation.  Indeed, it is worth noting that Lord Jauncey, who 
decided the Henderson case, was a conservative even amongst Scottish judges.198  Those 
same Scottish judges were, at least to begin with, much more adventurous with the 
ECHR than their English counterparts, although their enthusiasm may have been 
tempered by the outcomes of subsequent appeals to and decisions of the House of Lords 
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.199  At least with regard to privacy, 
however, the way is still open, it is suggested, for the Scottish courts to take their own 
approach to the question, and to develop a general principle informed by Article 8 of the 
ECHR and subject therefore to the other Articles of the Convention and such general 
defences as may seem appropriate in that light and under other principles of the 
common law.  In that process, lessons can certainly be learned from the jurisprudence 
being developed under the Southern Cross.  
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